This article was written by a member of Metro DC DSA. Opinions expressed here do not reflect the views or opinion of the chapter, but reflects commentary from an individual writer.
Author’s note: The popular podcast series Blowback will release its new season on September 22nd, now focused on Angola and the US-backed wars in Southern Africa. Nothing could be more relevant to the current political moment, as America once again allies with an apartheid state that commits aggressive proxy wars on its behalf in the name of regional stability. This piece was retooled from a research paper conducted nearly a decade ago, but updated to focus on local flavor and historical rhymes.
On January 31st, 1986, “Dr.” Jonas Savimbi found himself at the Conservative Political Action Conference (CPAC), seated on stage with Vice President George H.W. Bush, Jerry Falwell of the Moral Majority, and representatives of the Nicaraguan Contras, Afghan Mujahadeen, and Laotian anti-communist rebels. While CPAC gatherings have become famous in the last decade for their clown car assembly of far-right figures (e.g., Milei, Posobiec, Gorka, Abascal, Farage, etc.), the 1986 CPAC was intended to serve as a victory party for resurgent global anti-communism. Reports of the event note that Jeane Kirkpatrick, American ambassador to the United Nations, received standing ovations as she called for “real assistance” to these rebel groups:
“Real assistance means real weapons!
[Applause!]
Real helicopters…
[Applause!]
Real ground-to-air missiles…
[Applause!]
Whether that help is overt or covert is a bureaucratic detail.”
That night was a repudiation of “San Francisco Democrats,” the Sandinistas, the African National Congress (ANC), the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), the Farabundo Martí National Liberation Front (FMLN), and every other national liberation movement that dared to challenge US hegemony in that era. As Kirkpatrick, the master of ceremonies, rose to address the crowd for the final time that night, she emphatically declared: “We don’t need those types of national liberation movements, tonight we’ll have real national liberation movements.”
The beauty of hindsight and a half-decent moral compass is that they allow us to find the irony in celebrating this esteemed group of assassins, kidnappers, priest murderers, Red Cross killers, death squads, and the future Taliban as the conservative answer to “national liberation.” But really, who could have possibly known, at the time, that these guests of honor had committed great evil and would go on to perform even more unspeakable acts — other than the numerous protestors already assembled outside?
To be a leftist is to be cursed with being right too early.
Jonas Savimbi kept Angola in a state of war for over a quarter of a century. He was the unparalleled leader of UNITA, the anti-communist rebel force opposed to the ruling left-wing MPLA, whose K Street-polished public relations image took official Washington by storm. At every chance he was given for peace and reconciliation, he chose war. Even after ceasefires, peace treaties, and elections, he would return to war. To the public, Jonas Savimbi was branded as the "African Rambo,” a freedom fighter, and a small-d democrat. By the final end of the conflict in 2002, over 4 million had been displaced, 70,000 had lost limbs from land mines, and 800,000 were dead.
With this piece, I hope to provide readers a decent snapshot of one of America’s weirdest experiments in “regional stability” by noting:
I end the piece with a recommended reading list, if you hope to learn more about this subject, and my recommendation for the single best summer album in existence, which also happens to be a compilation of MPLA propaganda songs. I open with an optional background for anyone that wants to catch up to speed.
History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.
Angola was a Portuguese colony in Southwestern Africa until 1975. Commonly referred to as the “crown jewel” of Portugal’s empire, which also included Macau, Goa, Mozambique, Sao Tome & Principe, Cabo Verde, and Guinea-Bissau, Angola and the rest of these colonies spent most of the 20th century under the rule of Portugal’s fascist regime, Estado Novo. While slavery was de jure abolished for Angola in the 19th century, a system of organized forced labor, practically indistinguishable from slavery, persisted throughout much of Portugal’s African colonies up until independence.
Even among imperial powers, Portugal was considered the “sick man” stuck in the past. As Perry Anderson said, it was “the most primitive, the most defective and the most savagely exploitative colonial regime in Africa. Insulated from the world outside, functioning on force alone, it believed itself timeless, immune to the disorders sweeping the rest of European Africa. Like the Belgians in the Congo, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique thought they had abrogated history.” Portuguese colonialism was so antiquated and embarrassing that John F. Kennedy considered withholding military support to its important NATO ally over their opposition to Angolan independence, but like many presidents past and present backed down when confronted with the potential loss of Portugal’s provision of valuable military installations in the Atlantic. President Salazar of the Estado Novo regime even believed Kennedy supported a military coup against them, led by General Botelho Moniz in 1961, over the issue.
“Angola or the Azores” was the question for the US to consider, referring to the strategic NATO bases in the Portuguese Azores, and Kennedy chose the latter.
The greatest lie ever told about colonialism is that it was a system of benevolent development. Angola had a very small urban population, primarily concentrated in the capital Luanda, but nearly 7 million inhabitants in total. The great masses lived as peasants and subsistence farmers. William Mintner, in his invaluable “Apartheid’s Contras,” writes that on the eve of independence, only 80,000 people (including white Portuguese settlers) had completed more than four years of school. Illiteracy was 90%. Only 40 of the 3,000 university students in the entire country were African. All rail lines in the country went from interior areas to the coast, intended to bring raw goods for export, not to connect people, resources, goods, or services internally.
African decolonization was an uneven process, with each imperial power opting for a particular path based on what they thought they could get away with. The British granted Ghana and Egypt nominal independence largely peacefully, chose accommodation with white South Africa and Rhodesia, but viciously fought the Mau Mau in Kenya. The British attempted to hold their empire through economic ties, the Crown, and the Commonwealth. The French desperately fought and lost their scorched earth war against Algeria, then quickly pivoted to neocolonial cooperation treaties that forced signatories to continue using the former French colonial currencies (with reserves held overseas in Paris) and to protect the capital and property rights of French investors, all for the promise of “co-development.” These treaties have only been repealed by West African countries in the last few years. By the 1970s, Portugal stood alone among the European colonial powers as the only polity willing to fight the loss of its African colonial holdings. The Estado Novo remained committed to abrogating history through naked force.
Caption: The sign of any insecure empire, Portugal would publish maps that stated “Portugal is not a small country,” with the borders of its African holdings overlaid on Europe.
Angolans fought for nearly two decades against the Portuguese, first launching organized uprisings in 1961. Like many decolonization struggles, this war for independence varied in levels of intensity; massacres were commonplace. Angola was not alone in its fights against Portuguese rule: Mozambique (FRELIMO), Guinea Bissau and Cabo Verde (PAIGC), and Sao Tome (MLSTP) all had contemporary organized revolutionary independence movements.
Leading the Angolan struggle were a handful of political organizations commonly known by their acronyms:
After the Carnation Revolution of 1974, where young Communist officers staged a nearly peaceful coup that overthrew the Estado Novo regime in Portugal, the colonial wars were soon declared over. The Carnation Revolution did not appear out of nowhere. It was spurred by the soldiers’ and workers’ demands of “Decolonization, Democracy, and Development.” Young working-class soldiers were sick and tired of being conscripted and dying on behalf of colonial wars.2
One by one, Portugal signed peace treaties with opponents in each of its colonies. These treaties removed the Portuguese troops, granted independence, and often recognized Portugal’s opponent as the new legitimate government. In Angola, the Alvor Agreement in January of 1975 recognized all three factions (MPLA, FNLA, and UNITA) as the victors and called for elections to take place that November. The MPLA held the capital city and many of the most strategic locations and was positioned to do well in the upcoming elections. The independence war transitioned into a regional and civil war before the elections could be held, with FNLA and Zaire invading from the northeast and UNITA and South Africa attacking from the south and east. This war would last another two and a half decades and claim the lives of nearly a million people.
The MPLA quickly put out the call for aid, and Cuba answered. The small island sent an initial 4,000 troops to start, but that would later reach the tens of thousands. Fidel Castro, the eternal spokesperson for socialist internationalism, was quoted saying:
“Many of our ancestors came as slaves from Africa to this land. As slaves they struggled quite a great deal. They fought as members of the Liberating Army of Cuba. We're brothers and sisters of the people of Africa and we are ready to fight on their behalf!... And, today, who are the representatives, the symbols of the most hateful and inhuman form of racial discrimination? The South African fascists and racists. And Yankee imperialism, without scruples of any kind, has launched South African mercenary troops in an attempt to crush Angola's independence, and is now outraged by our help to Angola, our support for Africa and our defence of Africa. In keeping with the duties rooted in our principles, our ideology, our convictions and our very own blood, we shall defend Angola and Africa!”
With fewer openly apartheid states in existence today and many liberals in denial about the existence of the sole remaining one, it can be easy to forget that apartheid was and is an actually existing system of governance. It is not just an epithet. South Africa and Rhodesia ran on tightly controlled labor systems with strict internal passports to control native population movement, fake “bantustans” with nominal independence, separate legal systems, and white conscription. After World War I, South Africa was granted supervision of the League of Nations Mandate for the former German colony of South West Africa, now known as Namibia. When the United Nations ended the mandate, South Africa refused to leave and continued to occupy Namibia as its own colony. It ruthlessly fought the South West African People’s Organization (SWAPO) that battled for the freedom of Namibia, even attempting to prop up its own native sympathetic organizations to subvert SWAPO. Both South Africa and Rhodesia made themselves pariahs in the international community, but conservatives didn’t blink and instead advocated for a policy of “constructive engagement” with their wayward allies: i.e., “It’s not South Africa that’s the problem, it’s just the fault of the hard right government in power.”
To the paranoid mind of Cold War liberals and conservatives, communism was everywhere. A single spark could light a prairie fire across continents. Peaceful coexistence and detente were distant memories. By the mid 1970s, an insurgent “new right” raised on Bircherism, Jerry Falwell, and Ronald Reagan was publicly calling to take the fight back to the “commies.” American conservatives openly encouraged “Wars of National Liberation” — adopting the Left’s parlance at the time, following the Cuban and Chinese models, but against progressive, socialist, and anti-imperialist forces across the globe.
They viewed the post-Watergate criticisms of American power with the same disdain modern conservatives do for anything “woke.” They viewed Carter and his nominal support for civil rights at home and abroad as tantamount to being soft on global communism. Even the minor handcuffs on intelligence agencies — like the Clark Amendment of 1976, which banned secret funding for rebel groups in Angola without congressional authorization — were viewed as intractable obstacles that needed to be removed. Patience among American foreign policy circles was running out. To them, each country that left the Western sphere of influence was a direct threat to continued American hegemony. New strategies were required. Cloak and dagger, smoke and mirrors might not be enough to give anti-communists the edge anymore. Anti-communist rebels needed “real support,” with real guns, real ammunition, real money, and real missiles.
The Angolan Civil War was not the first time the United States intervened in a foreign conflict to prop up anti-communists. It was not the first time the United States backed sordid and unsavory characters abroad. But Angola was one of those all-American moments where public affairs, press coverage, and lobbying came together to turn a monster into a freedom fighter, while K Street firms cashed their checks.
What’s more American than that?
A common refrain from an overly defensive DC resident:
“Washington is the capital city. Washington is where all the lanyard dorks, politicians, reporters, and pundits live. I live in DC. The republicans all live in Navy Yard. The city I love is nothing like that. Walk left, stand right on the Metro.”
But it is worth remembering, when you’re out at a bar or riding said Metro, that you still have a decent chance of bumping shoulders with some of the most unhinged, bizarre, ambitious career climbers of our time; the folks that helped start lobbying firms like Black, Manafort, Stone, and Kelly (BMSK). Where else in this country could you form a single lobbying firm that would go on to launch the careers of multiple indicted Trump associates?
K Street lobbying firms battled on Capitol Hill on behalf of both UNITA and the MPLA starting as early as 1979.3 Savimbi was partially able to survive for so long on American funding due to his extensive network of lobbyists. Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) once remarked that “Savimbi always comes around appropriations time.”4
Savimbi initially hired Florence Tate, the civil rights activist turned journalist and then press secretary to DC Mayor Marion Barry, to conduct a public relations campaign for UNITA from 1979 to 1982. The early lobbying efforts failed to dramatically change American opinion, but led Savimbi to hire Black, Manafort, Stone, and Kelly in 1985. BMSK was a premiere Washington lobbying firm with several ties to the Reagan White House and employed many infamous characters, such as Lee Atwater (of racist “Southern Strategy” fame), Paul Manafort (of Trump “Russiagate” and pardon fame), and Roger Stone (of Trump sycophant, witness tampering, pardon, and Nixon tattoo fame). Other esteemed clients of BMSK at different times included the dictators Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire and Ferdinand Marcos of the Philippines.
The firm’s efforts were widely recognized as the source of Savimbi’s status as a “freedom fighter,” with Rep. Howard Wolpe (D-MI) writing that “the myth of Jonas Savimbi as an apostle of freedom is propagated by a nearly $2 million-a-year public relations operation led by the well-connected lobbying firm of Black, Manafort, Stone and Kelly.”5
The MPLA also hired lobbying firms to advocate for their interests, notably Washington, Perl and Debuc, who worked to arrange meetings with sympathetic lawmakers, though these were typically limited to members of Congress affiliated with the energy industry.6 Unlike UNITA, the MPLA faced a concerted opposition in their lobbying efforts. One lobbying firm even cancelled its contract with the MPLA after conservative clients threatened to take their business elsewhere. According to accusations made by James P. Gallagher, who was a legislative assistant with the House Republican Study Committee, the MPLA hired lobbyists to create rumors that non-lethal aid to Angola was being used to smuggle weapons to African anti-communist rebel groups.7 While both sides engaged in lobbying, UNITA was unquestionably more successful.8
One of BMSK’s largest achievements was organizing Savimbi’s regular and highly publicized visits to the United States. Savimbi made several trips to Washington, DC, to meet with lawmakers and State Department officials. Savimbi’s most successful meeting was in 1986, when he was able to meet with President Reagan. Afterwards, the White House issued its statement, noting:
“Dr. Savimbi enjoys significant support among the Angolan population. He seeks the withdrawal of all foreign forces and a process of internal political reconciliation in Angola. The United States believes that true peace in Angola can only result from national reconciliation and that UNITA has the right to participate in such a process. The President and Dr. Savimbi discussed a range of issues concerning the situation in southern Africa. The President supports UNITA's struggle against the presence of Soviet and Cuban forces in Angola.”
Savimbi spoke on multiple occasions at the Heritage Foundation, the conservative think tank that even then was influential in foreign policy circles. Savimbi remarked in a 1989 visit that “[w]hen we come to the Heritage Foundation, it is like coming back home,”9 also acknowledging that the Heritage Foundation’s lobbying efforts were instrumental in repealing the Clark Amendment, allowing for the covert funding of UNITA. Savimbi declared at the Heritage Foundation that “[m]any have asked whether we are fighting against something or fighting for something. Let me say that we are fighting for something. We are fighting for a change of the system at home. We are fighting for democracy, for a free market. We are fighting so our people can participate in the public life of our country.” The Heritage Foundation frequently published reports sympathetic to UNITA, even calling for their participation in the Cairo four-party negotiations (alongside the US, South Africa, Cuba, and Angola) designed to end the war. Policy analyst William Pascoe argued that Reagan should include Savimbi in the Cairo negotiations in order to test whether the MPLA were sincere about reaching a settlement.10
Even the labor movement helped in creating his polished image as a freedom fighter. In 1978, Savimbi met with former CIA Agent and National Security Council Senior Staff Member for African Affairs Gerald “Jerry” Funk. Jerry also happened to be with the AFL-CIO’s African American Labor Center, which helped facilitate that meeting in its own offices. Ironically, at that meeting NSC records state, “[Savimbi] also makes a strong point that while he is a ‘democratic socialist,’ he is first a nationalist, and shares ‘the basic human and political values with the U.S.’” 1978 was the same year that the AFL-CIO Executive Council declared that "U.S. corporations should immediately divest themselves of South African affiliates, and sever all ties with South African corporations."
Not all were receptive to UNITA’s lobbyists or presence in Washington. Some were actively hostile to Savimbi’s message. Representative Ron Dellums (D-CA) of the Congressional Black Caucus (CBC), an open democratic socialist, accused Savimbi and UNITA of war crimes on the House Floor:
“UNITA is not a freedom fighting organization. It is not. It is a surrogate, carrying out Cold War struggles. Last, I will debate members all day. Mr. Chairman, numerous reports of human rights abuses by UNITA, no laughing matter. The gentleman laughs, Mr. Chairman. Our covert activity has resulted in the death of 341,000 people, 55,000 children dead. No laughing matter. Amputees by the thousands. No laughing matter. This is serious business here.”
Representative Mervyn Malcolm Dymally (D-CA), another member of the CBC, rose in opposition to Savimbi’s 1986 visit, stating:
“Our government should not be in the position of helping to prop up the racist regional policies of South Africa... If we do support Savimbi, we will place ourselves in the curious position of supporting a Marxist government in Mozambique and helping to topple the same kind of government in Angola.”11
During the floor debate for the Intelligence Authorization Bill for fiscal year 1991, Representative Dan Glickman (D-KS) complained that the lobbyists were often better informed than the lawmakers. He remarked:
“The number of times that I am approached by people working for Mr. Savimbi and others, relating to me information which seems to be the kind of information I would be given as a member of the Intelligence Committee, information that I personally would not transmit to anybody else, gets transmitted to me by people who are being paid by parties to the action down there.”
It might not shock readers to find out that Savimbi received little critical coverage from the American press establishment. Most reporters treated him as a novelty, seemingly dazzled by the linguist, poet, philosopher, guerilla. Many would visit Savimbi in Jamba, taken on Potemkin village tours. Savimbi delivered a talk at the National Press Club, run by Peter Holmes of the Washington Times; at the event, Holmes seemed to suggest in certain questions that Africa or Africans were unsuited for democracy, stating, “You spoke a moment ago so eloquently about the prospects for democracy in Angola. Why are you so optimistic when there are so few real democracies in Black Africa today?”12
Savimbi did receive consistent negative coverage from left-wing publications and the anti-apartheid activist community, most notably TransAfrica Forum, run by Randall Robinson.13 But very few mainstream voices could see through the all-too-familiar "admit nothing, deny everything, and launch a counterattack" pattern that defined Savimbi and South Africa’s press relations.
American involvement and interest in Angola is inextricably linked to white South Africa’s dominance of the region. America only intervened in the Angolan Civil War following requests from Prime Minister B.J. Vorster of South Africa, who called upon the United States to prevent Angola from becoming a Soviet outpost.14 While the US initially funneled most of its monetary support through the FNLA and the regime of Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, it later encouraged the FNLA to align behind UNITA. American strategists realized that South Africa’s role as the regional anti-communist policeman worked best if it could act through strong proxies.
Savimbi’s narrative as a good-will representative of freedom fighters around the world only worked if the public didn’t raise questions about his strong allies in Pretoria. UNITA’s rise to media prominence coincided with America’s own burgeoning anti-apartheid movement, forcing Savimbi to answer questions that many anti-communist rebels in the past would not have faced. At CPAC 1986, Savimbi rejected accusations made by his critics, saying, “I don't approve of apartheid. How can I, as a Black leader, approve of apartheid? On one side I am branded as a communist, on the other side I am a puppet of South Africa!"15
This answer was sufficient for the conservative political establishment. Representative Vin Weber (R-MN) submitted an article by Charles Krauthammer into the congressional record, arguing that it was morally wrong to associate Savimbi with South African apartheid. Weber wrote: “[i]n other words, guilt by association. This is a weak and immoral argument. Savimbi deserves US aid because he is courageously, and successfully, opposing a Communist regime. Regardless of who supports him, Savimbi needs to be judged on his own merits.”16 That type of response became gospel to Savimbi’s defenders. South African connections were just a liberal distraction from Savimbi’s good works. And even if they were real, it was good to finally see someone stand up to the commies!
During a 1988 visit to the United States, Savimbi requested a meeting with the Congressional Black Caucus.17 The CBC declined to meet with the UNITA leader due to his connections to the apartheid regime in South Africa, with one journalist calling him the “puppet of Pretoria.” But many others didn’t have the same qualms. Savimbi was able to address a Black baptist church in Birmingham, Alabama, during this visit. The event was interrupted by protesters who chanted “Savimbi, Savimbi, have you heard? This is not Johannesburg!”18 Savimbi addressed the concerns of protesters in his speech, stating, “What I want is that the Black brothers and Black sisters afford me an opportunity to explain my struggle.” The rebel leader later explained that “when you fight a war, sometimes you have to accept some things you don't agree with.” These explanations failed to satisfy those that lived in a town that was not even a generation removed from the end of Jim Crow.
Several prominent African American politicians were forced to issue statements on whether the United States should support Savimbi. Among these politicians was Mayor Marion Barry of Washington, DC, who called for Savimbi to be treated “like the scourge of the earth he is.”19 DC’s first home-rule Delegate to Congress Walter Fauntroy boycotted Savimbi’s visit.
Mayor Andrew Young of Atlanta, the former ambassador to the United Nations under Carter and a prominent civil rights activist, visited Angola as part of a delegation in 1986. Young had traveled to Angola in 1978 and issued controversial statements claiming that former President Agostinho Neto might cooperate with the United States in order to free Namibia from South African occupation.20 Young also stated that the Cuban troops were not a threat to Angola’s freedom, rejecting the widespread notion of Soviet domination or “Cuban imperialism.”21 Young’s trip in 1986 was made at the behest of Stoney Cooks, a former work associate turned lobbyist for the MPLA. Following this visit, Young condemned UNITA and Savimbi, labeling American support for them as a “tragic mistake.”23
Reverend Jesse Jackson also visited Angola in 1986, reaching similar conclusions and calling South Africa an “evil empire.”24 In a telling statement, Jackson argued that Reagan would not listen to moral arguments when it came to foreign policy in Africa: “He doesn't understand that. What he understands is a strong media message that makes an impact on the American people."
UNITA recognized the importance of undermining civil rights criticism of Savimbi through deflection and distraction. Charles Evers, the brother of the slain civil rights leader Medgar Evers, visited Savimbi in Jamba, his trip echoing cynical criticisms made by UNITA against MPLA: that UNITA, not MPLA, was the Black nationalist, anti-colonial force in the civil war, due to the inclusion of prominent white and Mestiço members in MPLA leadership. Evers allegedly remarked that he was proud of Savimbi’s dedication to keeping Africa communist free, simultaneously denying allegations that Savimbi accepted support from South Africa: “If he has, then he certainly fooled me, but I still haven’t seen any evidence with my own eyes to suggest that he was getting money from South Africa.”25 One has to wonder whether Evers was lying or lied to, as South Africa’s financial and military support was thinly veiled and public knowledge by this point.
Savimbi is ultimately inseparable from his South African connections and the anti-apartheid movement that opposed him. During a series of peace negotiations in 1993, a South African diplomat quipped: “We and the Americans created Savimbi, but no one controls him.”26 Though this may have been true of Savimbi following the end of apartheid, it seems unlikely that he would have been confrontational towards Botha’s or de Klerk’s South Africa. In order to even visit him in Jamba then, journalists were required to seek escorts through Namibia guarded by South African Defence Forces.27
Criticism of South Africa during the early ‘80s was not as widespread as modern readers might expect. More common were attacks on anticolonial figures demonizing them as radicals, like when a conservative publication with connections to Freedom, Inc. routinely referred to Desmond Tutu as the “Black Ayatollah.”28 Right-wing defences of South Africa published in the National Review were always tied to apartheid’s role as a bulwark against the expansion of communism.29 These arguments came at a tremendous human cost, as South Africa throughout the ‘70s and ‘80s took an active role in undermining the self-determination of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia, Lesotho, Seychelles, Botswana, and Zimbabwe, among others.30 This resulted in the invasion and occupation of multiple sovereign countries, the targeted assassinations of ANC leaders in other countries, coups, bombings, terrorist attacks, indefinite detention without trial, and subjugation of millions.
The Reagan White House officially advocated for a policy of “constructive engagement” with South Africa, failing to appease committed Cold Warriors and angering anti-apartheid activists.31 Conservative defenses of Savimbi’s connections to Pretoria often were disguised as realist concerns, with many saying that Savimbi would be foolish not to accept South African aid. Even after the media support for Savimbi began to fade, members of Congress, including Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT), would attack anti-apartheid activists as attempting to “propagate Marxist propaganda under the cover of academic freedom.”32
If any of this feels repetitive in our current era, it’s because we once again are forced to contend with an apartheid state that has been given the greenlight to commit whatever acts of violence or repression it wishes through our blank check funding.
The same way that apartheid South Africa was the regional attack dog for US interests and a bulwark against communism, Israel has been the attack dog and bulwark against democratic, secular, progressive, and anti-imperial forces cohering in the Middle East.
The same way that apartheid South Africa invaded and occupied portions of southern Angola and Namibia, Israel does or has done the same in occupied Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon in just the last two years. If we scale out further, it is impossible to find a country in the region with which it has not been at war.
The same way that apartheid South Africa did not recognize its own borders as the limits of its military authority, bombed other countries with impunity, assassinated ANC leaders, trade unionists, and politicians in exile through bombings and gunmen, Israel carried out attacks with bombs and drones in Palestine, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Qatar, and Yemen in just a 72-hour period.
The same way that apartheid South Africa would attack SWAPO “rebel training centers” like the one at Cassinga — killing 600 people, claiming that they were all terrorists, and throwing their bodies into mass graves — Israel continues this tradition by bombing refugee camps, schools, and civilians under the excuse that they were future terrorists or simply near terrorists.
The same way that apartheid South Africa created “bantustans” or fake states with limited or nominal self-determination to hide their occupation, Israel obscures its occupation of Palestine by granting some minor roles of self governance to the Palestinian Authority, an entity whose own security forces get coopted into the very maintenance of the apartheid system. Even this fig leaf of a two-state solution did not satisfy the far right impulses of apartheid South Africa — and does not satisfy apartheid Israel.
The same way that apartheid South Africa partnered with complicit conservative, monarchical, and dictatorial states in the region like Malawi and Zaire, Israel has promoted peaceful cooperation in exchange for diplomatic normalization with multiple Arab states that are willing to look the other way.
The same way that apartheid South Africa was covered as a “complicated issue” by a docile and incurious press corps, Israel is given the same “it’s complicated” benefit of the doubt as the establishment media prints all reports of its wrongdoing with skepticism, publishing the state’s press releases without edits. "Admit nothing, deny everything, and launch a counterattack."
The same way that apartheid South Africa was only able to last as long as it did with the support and approval of the United States, Israel would crumble without our support and approval of its ongoing genocide.
The same way that apartheid South Africa was brought to its knees by a combination of an international economic and cultural boycott, diplomatic pressure, insurgent political forces inside and outside of the country, the refusal of conscripted soldiers to fight, and disciplined organization of the native trade union movement to shut the country down, so too will apartheid Israel be humbled.
We must stop the genocide. We must stop the war and the bombs. We must stop the money and trade. We must stop the repetition of history.
Savimbi was careful, in his speeches, to link his struggle to a larger global anti-communist effort, often phrasing his fight as a war against “Soviets, Cubans, and the communist system.”33 All of these anti-imperial pretenses tie into Reagan’s rhetoric of the Soviet Union as an “evil empire” — rhetoric echoed by Savimbi. The UNITA president called upon the Soviet Union, as late as 1989, to “give up their empire.”34
To Reagan-era Cold Warriors, UNITA’s struggle against the MPLA, Soviets, and Cubans was the same as the Contras’ struggle against the Sandinistas, the Laotian Rebels’ struggle against the Pathet Lao, and the Mujahideen's struggle against the Soviets. To supporters of Reagan, these anti-communist struggles were all connected and shared the same moral foundations, regardless of their often morally suspect tactics.35
The globalization of anti-communist “wars of national liberation” during the Reagan era was further demonstrated by the creation of the Democratic International in 1985 by the conservative lobbying firm Citizens for America. The organization was intended to serve as an anti-communist counterpart to the Socialist International, or Comintern.36 At the creation of the Democratic International, each member pledged to fight against “Soviet Colonialism,” labeling the Soviet Union as the “common enemy of mankind.”
Like many astroturfed conservative projects, the Democratic International imploded shortly after launch, when Citizens for America fired Executive Director Jack Abramoff for financial mismanagement and for going “hog wild” on expenses: reporting found that a large amount of the money raised went to parties and lavish spending. (“Casino Jack” also produced a film with full support from South Africa, titled Red Scorpion, based on the life of Savimbi. The protagonist, played by Dolph Lundgren of Rocky fame, disobeys his Soviet officers and joins the side of the anti-communist rebels. At a time when many Americans were beginning to seriously engage in economic and cultural boycotts of apartheid, the movie was filmed in South African-occupied Namibia and used actual South African military assets as props and extras.) Grover Norquist, another important fixture of Washington lobbying history, got his start as the national field director for Citizens for America and left for South Africa after the organization fell apart. Norquist also had a $5,000 per month contract with Savimbi and UNITA to raise their visibility.
In a testament to the ideological limitations of conservative internationalism, UNITA would only publicly align with other anti-communist movements if they continued to serve Savimbi’s long-term interests. UNITA quickly distanced itself from the Contras after they became politically toxic following the discovery of the Iran-Contra affair. Despite past revelations that the Contras had been using extrajudicial death squads to attack villages sympathetic to the Sandinistas, this had no effect on Savimbi’s decision to align with them in the Democratic International.37 Only after the Contras became a liability did UNITA distance itself. The Iran-Contra revelations led UNITA Foreign Secretary Tito Chingunji to publicly announce: “There's no doubt that there is a difference between the Contras and UNITA. From many different perspectives one can see who we are and who they are.”38
Less than two decades after its revolution, Cuba came to the aid of another country across an ocean in its fight against fascism, slavery, and colonialism. It did not focus on crafting carefully issued statements of support, though it did deliver them. It did not issue specific condemnations on the exact nature of fascist apartheid in South Africa, though the government did analyze it thoroughly. Cuba sought volunteers and mobilized its army to board boats and planes and make their way to Angola.
It is challenging not to feel sentimental about the solidarity of these Cuban soldiers as they defended Angola. In the 1610s, nearly 10,000 people each year were kidnapped and enslaved from Angola and sent to the West Indies. By the 18th century, Angola was the largest source of enslaved workers for the entire Atlantic trade; untold thousands were enslaved on the island of Cuba. Revolutionary Cuba named its own mission “Operation Carlota” after an 1843 slave revolt on the island. Cuba’s fight for Angolan freedom brings to mind the imagery of the Battle Hymn of the Republic, from our own freedom struggle. Righteous justice brought down on Judgment Day, through “His terrible swift sword.”
“As He died to make men holy, let us die to make men free…”
The Cuban support mission would grow to nearly 60,000 troops. For its relative size, that is the equivalent of the United States committing a force of 1.8 million troops. This was not some customary delegation of technical advisors and support personnel. This was real assistance, real weapons, real helicopters, real ground-to-air missiles, and much more.
The Cuban intervention reached its spiritual pinnacle with the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987, where the myth of South African military superiority was irreparably pierced. In the remote southeast of Angola, the two sides squared off in their largest head-to-head action, more reminiscent of conventional World War II frontlines than the guerilla warfare and counterinsurgency the parties had become accustomed to. A battle between tanks, bombers, fighter aircraft, armored personnel carriers, artillery, and thousands of troops was won by the MPLA, the ANC, and Cuba at great cost. But politically it would change the perception of South Africa by Black Africans forever. The most prominent Black South African newspaper wrote, “Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban success in Angola. Black Africa is tasting the heady wine of the possibility of realizing the dream of ‘total liberation.’”
Lucio Lara, general secretary of the MPLA, reminisced about the Cuban mission:
“the most generous people, real internationalists. Cuban internationalism has had a very special character, very fair and generous. Even today we have Cuban students sent by Fidel to build schools for our children and orphans. Remember how we defeated the invasion of Luanda? It was with Cuban instructors, thanks to their training. We were used to guerrilla warfare, and suddenly we were having to deal with the advance of large conventional armies. The South African apartheid army was stopped by us with Cuban aid, above all strategic and tactical aid.”
Real socialist internationalism requires working-class state power. There cannot be any force of internationalism and solidarity strong enough to overcome our opponents without it. Our strategies need to come to terms with this. I emphasize this point about state power not to criticize my fellow comrades in Democratic Socialists of America, but because I cannot help but feel that much of our internationalism work does not always grapple with this question directly. In its place, we occasionally refocus on rhetorical support. Many of us would like to think we would extend the same solidarity if we were in the Cubans’ place in history. But if rhetorical support is insufficient and we have very limited control over the levers of state power, what can we do?
Above all, we owe the working people of this world a solemn duty to be effective in supporting their struggles. This means being effective in things that ease and assist their struggles. Principle among them is our duty to oppose ongoing and future wars and genocides, to not allow for the creation of “Contras,” to do our best to grow the movement of working people, and to use state power where we can to bring more pressure in support of the global working class.
But all of this work may look less revolutionary than many revolutionary socialists will be comfortable with. The unfortunate reality is that the path to real internationalism, one where we can materially support the international struggles of working people with real assistance, may start outside of “international” work altogether. It may start with many more city council campaigns, contract campaigns, new unionization drives, tenant organizing, and face-to-face conversations with countless thousands of people who have no idea what we mean when we say “internationalism.”
As uncomfortable as it may be for many of us to consider, a mass politics approach to internationalism may start with kitchen table and pocket book issues, even though we want to argue on the grounds of morality. This is not a call to step back from the international work that DSA does. Nor is this a call to abandon our internationalist principles. It is a reminder that we have a duty to be effective, and the number one thing that we can do to help others, as American socialists, is to stop the attacks against them and use whatever levers of state power we can to aid their causes.
Workers know that their building has mold and the laundry machines are always broken. It is our responsibility to build the link in their minds between the reason they can’t afford quality housing and the wars and genocide overseas. When people can’t afford their medications or go to the hospital without going into debt, we should be ready to connect our country’s preference for military spending over universal healthcare. It is our duty to take the discomfort people feel when they see naked injustice on their TV or phone screen, and make it clear that those injustices are occurring elsewhere in the world because of decisions American politicians made.
We must be the ones to reveal the city’s or union’s pension plan investments in apartheid, and explain how their money would be better spent elsewhere. We need to convince the anti-Trump liberal partisans that AIPAC is an anti-democratic and anti-Democratic force that’s subverting our democracy.
It is our duty to win at the ballot box with anti-imperial and internationalist candidates, even if that means recognizing that most voters aren’t primarily won over on those terms.
No one will do this work for us.
Following Savimbi’s death in 2002, many publications rushed to publish articles condemning the warlord’s role in destabilizing Angola. Some argued that Savimbi’s death was a victory for peace in Angola. There were countless newspapers that published scathing obituaries that painted Savimbi as a monster who only sought power, even at the price of peace. Fred Bridgland, Savimbi’s most prominent biographer, even called him “the dragon of death who had to be slain.”39 Many of these publications had been either pro-Savimbi or silent when public opinion really mattered. What changed over the years to make the Washington Post, New York Times, and others change their tune about Savimbi? Was it the revelation of new information? Was it news about his war crimes and violent past? Or was it a fundamental change in the political culture?
A lot had changed since Savimbi first burst onto the political scene. The Cold War had ended, apartheid South Africa had fallen, further allegations of Savimbi’s war crimes and violence had come to light, and relations with Angola had normalized. Savimbi was no longer a strategic asset but a liability. Neoconservatives might have come back to power with George W. Bush’s victory, but they were no longer solely intent on the destruction of the Soviet Union. These neocons were focused on the Global War on Terror, a battle against non-state actors that threatened American hegemony and interests. Savimbi no longer fit America’s desired foreign policy narrative.40 In fact, he fit the description of America’s new enemies. Many publications that had previously described Savimbi as a freedom fighter now labeled him posthumously as a terrorist.41
But what happened to the complicit? What happened to the careers of journalists that uncritically published South African denials of massacres or UNITA collaboration? What happened to the lobbyists that bought homes with UNITA paychecks? What happened to the hundreds of thousands of dead and wounded?
“One day, everyone will have always been against this.”
For those that have not had the pleasure, I strongly encourage reading Piero Gleijeses’ "Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa.” Additionally, William Minter’s “Apartheid’s Contras: An Inquiry Into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique” is a shockingly clear depiction of South Africa’s covert and not so subtle involvement. Elaine Windrich did an incredible analysis of American media and lobbying complicity in the Angolan Civil War. I recommend reading her “The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi, the U.S. Media and the Angolan War.” The journalist Leon Dash’s archives are in the University of Illinois archives and also contain incredible snapshots of primary source coverage of Savimbi.
As promised, the single best summer music album — perfect for grilling, cracking open a beer, or sitting on the beach — is Angola: Forward, People's Power. The album was recorded at the National Radio Station in Luanda by Agrupamento Kissanguela in 1978 and was reportedly played at MPLA rallies. The music has clear Cuban influences, not uncommon to Southern Africa at the time. The album features some incredible hits, including my personal favorite, “Invasores de Angola,” which just lists all of the different forces attacking the People’s Republic of Angola.
Also make sure to check out the new season of Blowback, available September 22nd.
The following are sources cited that were not able to be linked electronically.
Bridgland, Fred. Jonas Savimbi: A Key to Africa. New York: Paragon House, 1987.
Brittain, Victoria. "Jonas Savimbi, 1934-2002." Review of African Political Economy, 29, no. 91 (2002): 128-30. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4006867.
Cohen, Herman J. The Mind of the African Strongman: Conversations with Dictators, Statesmen, and Father Figures. Washington, D.C.: New Academia Publishing, 2015.
Continetti, Matthew. The K Street Gang: The Rise and Fall of the Republican Machine. New York: Doubleday, 2006.
C-SPAN. “Angolan Civil War.” October 6, 1989. https://www.c-span.org/video/?9419-1/angolan-civil-war.
____. “Angolan Party Leader at White House.” October 7, 1991. https://www.c-span.org/video/?21936-1/angolan-party-leader-white-house.
____. “Jonas Savimbi of UNITA Answers Questions.” July 1, 1988. https://www.c-span.org/video/?3229-1/jonas-savimbi-unita-answers-questions.
____. “Photo Opportunity.” October 5, 1989. https://www.c-span.org/video/?9405-1/photo-opportunity.
____. “Political Discussion.” January 31, 1986. https://www.c-span.org/video/?125968-1/political-discussion.
____. “UNITA News Conference.” October 2, 1990. https://www.c-span.org/video/?14309-1/unita-news-conference.
Gleijeses, Piero. Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991. Chapel Hill: UNC Press, 2013.
Human Rights Watch. “Human Rights Watch World Report 1989.” Washington, D.C., 1989.
Jackson, Henry F. From the Congo to Soweto: U.S. Foreign Policy toward Africa since 1960. New York: W. Morrow, 1982.
James, W. Martin. A Political History of the Civil War in Angola, 1974-1990. New Brunswick, NJ, U.S.A.: Transaction Publishers, 1992.
Kirkpatrick, Jeane J. The Withering Away of the Totalitarian State- and Other Surprises. Washington, D.C.: AEI Press, 1990.
____. "The Superpowers: Is There a Moral Difference?." World Affairs 147, no. 1 (Summer 1984): 24.
Leon Dash Papers, University of Illinois Archives.
McFaul, Michael. "Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola." International Security 14, no. 3 (1989): 99-135.
____. “The Demise of the World Revolutionary Process: Soviet-Angolan Relations Under Gorbachev.” Journal of Southern African Studies 16, no. 1 (March 1990).
"Madison Avenue and Third World." Economic and Political Weekly 25, no. 4 (1990): 203. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4395866.
Minter, William. Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique. Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994.
Newsom, David D. The Public Dimension of Foreign Policy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.
____. The Imperial Mantle: The United States, Decolonization, and the Third World. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.
Nixon, Ron. Selling Apartheid: South Africa’s Global Propaganda War. Auckland Park, South Africa : Jacana, 2015.
Russell, Alec. Big Men, Little People: The Leaders Who Defined Africa. New York, NY: New York University Press, 2000.
Scott, James M. Deciding to Intervene: The Reagan Doctrine and American Foreign Policy. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.
Spikes, Daniel. Angola and the Politics of Intervention: From Local Bush War to Chronic Crisis in Southern Africa. Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 1993.
Vines, Alex. "Beyond Savimbi." The World Today 58, no. 4 (2002): 14-15. http://www.jstor.org/stable/40476662.
Weigert, Stephen L. Angola: A Modern Military History, 1961-2002 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011).
Windrich, Elaine. "Media Coverage of the Angolan Elections." Issue: A Journal of Opinion 22, no. 1 (1994): 19-23. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1166403.
____. The Cold War Guerrilla: Jonas Savimbi, the U.S. Media, and the Angolan War. New York: Greenwood Press, 1992.
____. "The Politics of the Angolan War: A UNITA Perspective." Africa Today 39, no. 12 (1992): 146-47. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4186815.
