ALTHOUGH THE HEADLINES HAVE DIED DOWN, the assault on federal workers’ livelihoods and union rights has not let up. Nor has the attack on public service itself. Both are the culmination of a decades-long, corporate-inspired initiative to undermine, via public policy and cultural tropes, the notion of government itself. The connection between the drive to destroy unions and the attempt to weaken government regulations, programs, services is not accidental — it is inevitable.
Federal workers, in response, have created the Federal Unionist Network (FUN) as a rank-and-file organization working through existing unions while also building ties to non-union workers. FUN has played a critical role in mobilizations against Trump's anti-federal worker policies as well as serving as a resource for mutual support. The challenge they will face is how to sustain this network over the long-term, how they can sustain membership involvement and solidarity across agencies represented by different unions — a challenge and a need even where local and national leaderships are supportive of such initiatives.
That need is even sharper when union leadership isolates itself from the membership as happened in the National Association of Letter Carriers (NALC). In response, rank-and-file activists have been organizing to put the union back on the course of member-driven militancy. Reviewing the history of NALC rank-and-file organizing that followed the 1970s wildcat strike, can serve as a useful reminder that rebuilding union democracy is inseparable from building workplace strength. It is a history relevant to all unionists, even those with progressive accountable leadership.
By a margin of 70% — 63,680 to 26,304 — NALC members rejected a proposed contract negotiated by union leadership and the Postal Service earlier this year. The decision, announced in February, creates a new challenge because postal strikes are illegal. If the union is unable to reach a new agreement with management, the next step is binding arbitration. The American Postal Workers Union (APWU), with a militant leadership that has been more in tune with its membership, is also in contract negotiations with USPS.
Bargaining is taking place while all postal workers are under pressure from a Trump administration hostile to unionism, hostile to federal workers, hostile to the Postal Service. Musk’s chainsaw approach to federal government service — undermining education, health, pension and other public services of our already too-weak social safety net — was the first step toward the Administration’s order banning unions in the federal sector. Postal workers, with the strongest legal rights for federal workers, have a bullseye on their backs, all of which makes binding arbitration fraught with risk.
Letter carrier courage to resist in this climate and reject an inadequate contract began with anger — in this instance anger at USPS for proposing terms that offered members a 1.3% per year wage increase, maintained existing wage tiers, and failed to address contract compliance (i.e., management’s refusal to abide by previously agreed upon workplace rules). The proposed contract allows for speed-up along with its twin, layoffs, by reducing letter carrier office time, which could lead to route elimination. That anger is also directed at NALC’s national leadership for its refusal to keep membership informed during negotiations that lasted over two years, its unwillingness to accept membership input.
Courage, however, also comes from confidence rooted in membership solidarity. “Build a Fighting NALC,” a rank-and-file organization, organized the “No” vote campaign through a network of active members and local leadership in branches across the country. That campaign reflected membership commitment to their union, to their work, and to their potential power.
Their action was reminiscent of 1978 — the prior instance of a membership contract rejection, fueled by an aroused rank-and-file unwilling to accept a contract that failed to meet their needs.
In the 1950s and 60s, postal workers found their workload increasing while their pay left them ever further behind private sector workers. Many letter carriers moonlighted to make ends meet; absent doing so, some full-time carriers and clerks were eligible for welfare. Those conditions stood out in an era in which, unlike today, precarious work was the exception, not the rule. The majority of manufacturing workers and about 30% of all workers were organized in the 1960s, a level of union density which kept wages high enough so that most families in most industries could get by on one paycheck. That decade was also a time of growing restiveness as management’s response to workers improved pay was speed-up and abusive supervision. Letter carriers, post office clerks, mail handlers had few on the job protections without wage parity.
Postal workers were well organized, but their high level of organization did not translate into bargaining strength. They were divided into multiple unions, and many branches functioned more like fraternal mutual support organizations than as vehicles to confront management. NALC was an example of craft in its purest form: every member had the same trade — delivering the mail — and every member worked under one standard agreement. The union from its early years developed a strong lobbying program — but this was highly parochial, isolated from other federal or municipal workers let alone the wider labor movement.
After defeats in a couple of major campaigns in the 1950s, in particular losing the battle to keep twice-a-day-delivery (hard to believe today, but important at the time), even that form of political engagement began to wither on the vine. Dissatisfaction began to grow from the contradiction between the importance of this uniformed public service and the treatment of postal workers by authoritarian management.
From the mid-1960s forward, workplace conflicts — including unofficial “sickouts” — grew as the pace of work intensified, while pay raises were consistently deferred. Union leaders were incapable of meeting the challenge — but the rank and file was prepared to act. In March 1970, Congress voted itself a pay raise while putting off for the umpteenth time consideration of a very modest pay increase of postal workers. March 18: rank-and-file letter carriers in New York voted to begin an illegal wildcat strike, set up a picket line, and shut down the mail. Within days, workers walked out across New York State, Connecticut and New Jersey and then spread throughout the country — Akron, Boston, Chicago, Detroit, Houston, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, San Francisco and other cities. Postal clerks, beginning in the Bronx, joined in, an act of solidarity that reinforced the strike, prevented scabbing, and built genuine unity amongst postal workers in all crafts. Within a week, about 200,000 workers in 15 states had walked out.
President Nixon obtained federal injunctions; workers ignored them. Union leaders pleaded for a return to work; they too were ignored. Nixon ordered federal troops and National Guard units to move the mail; they occupied the post offices but did not have the skills to do the job. Nonetheless, pressure mounted, and two days after the military was called in, the strike ended. Congress was now willing to act. Postal workers received a significant pay increase, and all charges against striking workers were lifted. The old Post Office Department was replaced by the United States Postal Service (USPS), which was created as an independent agency authorized by the federal government. The act gave postal workers collective bargaining rights to negotiate over wages, benefits and working conditions. Strikes, however, remained prohibited. Established to function like a corporation, USPS, though subsidized, was expected to make a profit — an ominous development which postal workers well understood at the time.
Close-knit relationships amongst letter carriers in their work stations and within various branches created the framework for the wildcat strike to unfold and spread. Prior to 1970, few of the rank-and-file leaders who emerged during the strike held office at any level within the union. That included Vince Sombrotto, who had worked as a letter carrier more than 20 years before his emergence as a leader of the rank-and-file movement. After the strike ended, NALC members created an organizational framework to further transform the union. A brief outline of the events which followed include:
October 1970 — New York City (Branch 36) station delegate elections resulted in rank-and-file winning 22 out of 24 contests against leadership candidates.
December 1970 — All twenty Branch 36 rank-and-file candidates won local leadership contests, including Sombrotto, elected branch president.
January–April 1971 — Rank-and-file slates were successful in Minnesota, Philadelphia, Boston and numerous other branches, large and small.
June–July 1971 — NALC leadership imposes trusteeship on Branch 36 to inhibit criticism during the first post-strike contract bargaining. The trusteeship was lifted after bargaining was concluded.
July 20, 1971 — Conclusion of negotiations between postal unions with USPS. Working Agreement provided for wage increases and first ever “cost of living adjustment” (COLA) but failed to improve fringe benefits or preserve craft lines between clerks and carriers (and thus protect jobs and working conditions for inside and outside postal work). And because the agreement increased management disciplinary authority, widespread membership dissatisfaction persisted. As quoted in NALC’s official history, one rank-and-file leader explained why:
“[The Agreement will lead to] increased supervision and harassment of letter carriers; arbitrary discipline; increased productivity with no benefits; reduction in personnel; elimination of carrier assignments; accelerated changes and additions to letter carrier routes; deteriorating service which would bring unfair criticism from the patrons to the letter carrier; and an overall and large-scale problem with morale.”
October 13, 1971 — A “conference of concerned letter carriers” was convened in Minneapolis. Participants constitute themselves as the National Rank-and-File Movement and set forth three demands: a) direct elections of national officers, b) regional elections for regional officers, c) national agreements must be ratified by membership vote.
1972 New Orleans and 1974 Houston — National convention battles result in rank-and-file victories. Delegates approved all three demands, strengthening union insurgents going forward.
Gaining the right to elect national and regional leadership and the right to vote on proposed contracts was needed as management pressure on postal workers intensified. The Postal Service, putting profits over service — as predicted — decided to compensate for paying higher wages by increased “efficiency,” i.e., speed-up and forced overtime.
The form this took was announced in April 1974, when management introduced the Letter Carrier Route Evaluation System (LCRES) as a pilot project in Kokomo, Indiana. A second pilot followed in February 1975, at a Portland, Oregon station. The so-called “Kokomo Plan” was an attempt to impose factory assembly line methods of workplace control on letter carriers. Management eliminated the existing annual “count week” which set letter carrier routes, a method which took into account the different nature of routes as well as the experience of carriers. Now, a one-size fits all approach was mandated.
Under the LCRES system, USPS supervisors monitored letter carrier movements in the office and on the street to set a uniform delivery standard. Each worker, no matter the route, was expected to deliver the same amount of mail in the same amount of time. The stop-watch method of human control needed to implement this form of “scientific management,” reached inhuman levels. Two letter carriers described how it worked:
“The efficiency experts measured and timed how far a carrier walks to and from the time clock, and how far he walks in pulling his cases. The distance the carrier’s arm moves in casing a letter was noted. They even measured to the split second the time it took for the carrier to move his eyes from the case back to the next letter. At this rate, if you sneezed, you could be charged with delay in the mail.”
Despite NALC national union leadership’s opposition, rank-and-file delegates voted at the 1974 Convention to authorize an illegal strike if management attempted to impose the Kokomo Plan nationally. Members in the two stations where the plan was in place filed numerous grievances as a step in fighting back, creating pressure on management and on union leadership. That was the basis for NALC’s 1975 decision to take USPS to arbitration. NALC argued that LCRES violated the contract provision against forced overtime and violated the provision that work standards had to be “fair, reasonable, and equitable.” On the eve of the union’s 1976 Convention, arbitrators ruled that the “Kokomo Plan” violated the contract on both grounds. The victory strengthened the rank-and-file movement as membership unity and willingness to act had proved decisive.
Over the course of its long history, the NALC grew through building multiple branches — a function of a workforce with strong local bonds fostering a fraternal sense of togetherness. By 1970, the union had over 5,000 branches, the majority with less than 100 members. As Postal Service management became more centralized, however, multiple small branches became ineffective. Most didn’t have full-time officers while steward training was minimal and inadequate. A crisis was brewing as USPS’ profit-oriented management became more aggressive — a survey conducted by the union in 1974 revealed that of 4,000 grievances filed, at least 2/3 were not properly documented.
In response, a wave of branch mergers occurred, state associations were formed, quarterly steward training was initiated. As a result, letter carriers gained greater strength and confidence when management violated the contract. Yet despite reforms progress was slow, there was a huge backlog of grievances, and the national union was losing over 85% of all cases that went to arbitration. Internal differences within the union intensified as workplace tensions grew; Sombrotto, running against the incumbent President James Rademacher, was narrowly defeated in this first election decided by membership vote.
All this came to a head in contract negotiations in 1978. NALC leadership brought an agreement to members that eliminated the “no lay-off” clause agreed to in 1971, capped COLA increases at a time of high inflation, and provided a lower pay increase than expected. Many members strongly objected and a vote “No” campaign was launched. The combination of the deep roots developed throughout the union by the National Rank-and-File Movement, the militant leadership elected in multiple branches after 1970, the debates over which way forward for letter carriers generated by Sombrotto’s insurgent campaign and the increased membership awareness and participation in the internal life of the union turned the tide. NALC leadership’s argument that the contract was the best they could win was unconvincing. Members used their newly won right to vote on the contract and rejected the agreement.
New talks deadlocked, an arbitrator split the difference between union and management positions, leaving letter carriers dissatisfied — both with the result and the fact that the decision had been taken out of their hands. Later in 1978, a new election for union president took place. This time Sombrotto won by a large margin as did most of his slate. NALC’s transformation underway since the 1970 wildcat, reached its culmination with a renewed sense of unity.
Following a different tempo, analogous changes took place amongst other postal workers following the strike. The American Postal Workers Union was founded in January 1971 as a merger of five separate craft unions under the leadership of Moe Biller whose action in persuading his members not to cross letter carrier picket lines in New York was critical to the success of the 1970 strike. The newly formed APWU initially worked closely with NALC and there was some talk of a further merger to create organizational unity between them and the other postal unions — the independent Rural Letter Carriers and the Mail Handlers (part of the Laborers) — but the impetus toward that end quickly withered and each union increasingly went its own way.
Nonetheless, during the 1980s and 90s, postal workers made major bargaining and legislative gains, the rights won by the 1970 strike and subsequent reform movement helping propel their pay and benefits above those of most other federal workers. Yet the other side of gains came ever-steady pressure — USPS commitment to profit has taken its toll on workers and their rights and weakened ties to the public.
Since then, APWU leadership has built upon the militancy of its origins. Unfortunately, within NALC, the impetus for reform weakened, especially after Sombrotto’s retirement in 2002 The close connection between an active membership and elected leadership that characterized the union in the 1980s and 90s withered. Over the years, the various postal unions have struggled to act in concert with each other. Management has taken advantage of that cleavage in every way.
Complicating the bargaining position facing all postal workers has been technological change as the internet fulfills many functions that had previously been possible only by mail. Union strength has been weakened too by the slow but steady erosion of the postal monopoly through the growth and expansion of private package delivery, private business authorization to sell postage stamps, the closing of many post offices and elimination of many mailboxes.
All this has now come to a head. The Trump Administration proposal to dissolve the USPS and put it under the Commerce Department, is a first step toward privatization (after all, what’s one more violation of the Constitution). Yet, even before Trump’s accession to office, postal workers and the postal service have been under siege. One look north to Canada shows that postal workers are facing the same pressures on labor (long hours, speed-up, inadequate wages) and service (threats of post office closures and privatization). The union response, therefore, has to be not only directed at the immediate danger posed by the Trump Administration, but also the structural challenge of the role of mail delivery in the future.
Circumstances are different today than 55 years ago. The past can’t be replicated, and there is no formula or set piece strategy as to how to organize in today’s world. But this brief excursion into how a prior generation of postal workers organized and moved forward may provide some food for thought.
Current federal workers should remember:
Conditions facing postal workers today are grim, but if past is prologue, it will be possible to overcome today’s challenges. Letter carriers, clerks and other postal unionists will forge their own path, building on the heritage of the 1970s by means that grow out of contemporary realities. Postal service is still a necessity; it is still the branch of the federal government that interacts positively with people more often than any other. Reforms are possible that could enhance its role, but these won’t happen without postal worker input, without respect for postal worker rights and dignity, without mutual support amongst all federal workers and beyond.
As Tyler Vasseur, a letter carrier in Minneapolis Branch 9 and a leader in Build a Fighting NALC put it: “Ultimately our fight for our contract is one and the same as our fight for a public postal service.”
Carriers in a Common Cause: NALC’s Official History researched and written by M. Brady Mikusko and F. John Miller, updated edition 2014: 1971-1978: In the Aftermath of Victory, pp 77 –90 (source for rank & file quotes). Note: I worked in the NALC Publications department from 1985–88. As part of my job, I wrote a draft for the chapter of the union’s history covering the 1970s —KS.
Alexandra Bradbury, Postal Workers Brace for Trump's Wrecking Ball, Labor Notes, March 3, 2025. (source for Tyler Vasseur quotes).
Stanley Aronowitz and Jeremy Brecher, The Postal Strike in Root and Branch: The Rise of the Workers Movement (Fawcett Crest Book, Greenwich, CT, 1975) pp 28–38
Jeremy Brecher: Strike! (South End Press, Boston, 1980) pp 271-274
Marc Kagan, Learning from the 1970 Postal Workers' Strike, Jacobin, April 27, 2025
Alexandra Bradbury, op. cit.
Eric Chornoby, Targeted Postal Workers Are a Bellweather for All US Unions, Labor Notes, February 26, 2025.
Rob Darakjian, After Resounding "No" Vote, Letter Carries Should Go On Offensive, Labor Notes, February 12, 2025.
Alexandra Bradbury, Letter Carriers Are Organizing Against an Insulting 1.3 Percent Raise, Labor Notes, November 14, 2024
Rob Darakjian, Fellow Letter Carriers, Stand Together and Vote No on Sellout Contract!, Labor Notes, October 24, 2024
Gabriela “Gabby” Calugay-Casuga, Postal Employees Halt Overtime Work, rabble.ca, May 23, 2025
Samantha Porter, The Perspective of a Letter Carrier in Toronto, rankandfile.ca, Dec. 6, 2024
