
From Denver, to Detroit, to Dyckman Street, democratic socialist candidates in congressional primaries achieved greater success in 2026 than in any prior cycle. DSA-endorsed candidates Claire Valdez (NY-7), Darializa Avila Chevalier (NY-13), Chris Rabb (PA-3), Donovan McKinney (MI-13), and Melat Kiros (CO-1) all won their primaries in overwhelmingly Democratic districts. Additionally, William Lawrence (MI-7), a longtime former member who was not endorsed by DSA but identifies as a democratic socialist, won both his primary and a moderately close race against his Republican challenger in the general election in a purple district. And Angie Nixon, who recently became a DSA member but is not an endorsed candidate, lost narrowly in her uphill battle to represent Florida in the U.S. Senate after winning a primary election in which she was massively outspent by a margin of roughly $16 million to $1 million.
Angela Gonzales-Torres (CA-34), who has DSA’s national endorsement, and Mai Vang (CA-7), who has Sacramento DSA’s local endorsement, also advanced, with Gonzales-Torres soundly beating incumbent Democrat Representative Jimmy Gomez and Vang narrowly losing to incumbent Democrat Representative Doris Matsui in the general election. Supplementing the ranks of explicitly democratic socialist candidates, a range of insurgent progressives — particularly those who are critical of the mainstream Democratic Party’s support for Israel’s genocide of Palestinians — have done well, too: Abdul El-Sayed (MI-Senate), Adam Hamawy (NJ-12), Brad Lander (NY-10), Analilia Mejia (NJ-11), Frederick Haynes (TX-30), and Justin Pearson (TN-9). Of these, only Pearson lost in the general election, and narrowly at that.
At the same time, not every left campaign for federal office has resulted in victory. To some extent, that is as it should be: if a movement wins every fight that it picks, that is a good sign it is being too risk-averse. A healthy acceptance that some defeats are inevitable, however, does not mean that DSA should not proactively apply lessons from the defeats of endorsed candidates like Oliver Larkin (FL-25) and Cori Bush (MO-1) or from the defeats of unendorsed insurgents in our region like Jakeya Johnson (MD-4), Wala Blegay (MD-5), Alexis Goldstein (MD-6), and Mo Seifeldein (VA-8). This article examines five lessons from this cycle to give Metro DC DSA the best shot at victory in our next regional congressional bid.
1. Money Matters
Left-wing insurgent congressional candidates and their aligned super PACs do not need to match their opponents’ fundraising dollar-for-dollar. In the majority of these races, left-wing candidates have been at a financial disadvantage, especially when super PAC spending is taken into account. There are exceptions. For instance, Chris Rabb outraised his leading opponents, one (Sharif Street) narrowly and one (Ala Stanford) by a considerable margin. Still, that was not the norm, and there are notable examples — such as Melat Kiros’ race against Diana DeGette and Darializa Avila Chevalier’s race against Adriano Espaillat — of establishment candidates outspending democratic socialists.
But if we do not need to outraise our opponents, what do we need to do? To answer that, it is helpful to work backward from how the money a candidate raises actually gets used. Our candidates need enough money to hire experienced staff, send mailers, and — unlike the races that Metro DC DSA is used to — produce and run television ads. In 2026, that averaged in the ballpark of $1 million, but there are reasons to believe that more will be required in 2028. Metro DC is a more expensive media (and job) market than Denver, Detroit, and Philadelphia, though obviously not New York City, and the presidential primary in 2028 may drive up the cost of ad slots. Raising $1.5 million to campaign in the primary elections would be a more appropriate goal, and Metro DC DSA should look skeptically upon any candidate who cannot give a coherent explanation of how they will raise that much.
Unsuccessful candidates who raised less than $1 million broadly fall into two categories: outsiders who ran to fill an otherwise vacant left lane to ensure that a flawed incumbent did not go unchallenged, and candidates with a real movement base. Candidates in the former category often struggled to break $100,000 and thus were not well-positioned to hire staff, never mind run television ads. Those in the latter category — like Oliver Larkin, who had both local and national DSA endorsements, and the non-socialist progressive Wala Blegay, who was endorsed by frequent progressive allies of Metro DC DSA — tended to raise hundreds of thousands of dollars but still fell short of what winning candidates garnered. In 2020, Mckayla Wilkes’ fundraising performance in her DSA-endorsed bid for the MD-5 seat was not dissimilar. Nor were her ultimate results: a defeat that was neither a nailbiter nor a total embarrassment. A candidate’s ability to raise half a million dollars may sound impressive, but it is insufficient to run a winning campaign.
Super PAC money matters too, but not as much, given that its utility is more or less cabined to the ad wars. It is also legitimately more difficult for the left to level the playing field with respect to super PAC spending than it is with respect to grassroots individual fundraising. Still, the involvement of the super PAC American Priorities, which has prioritized support for pro-Palestine candidates who are often democratic socialists or progressives, has been helpful to left electoralists in the 2026 cycle. Voters often tune ads out after a point of saturation, so, while a candidate would obviously rather have $6 million in outside ad spending on their behalf (which AIPAC’s United Democracy Project would have the capacity to muster) than $1 million (of which American Priorities might be capable), that additional $5 million is not worth five times as much as the first $1 million in practical terms.
Metro DC DSA should monitor the field to see if additional super PACs like American Priorities emerge, but for now, it is worth noting that American Priorities has announced that MD-5 — in which AIPAC-backed Delegate Adrian Boafo won the primary this year — will be one of its top nine priority districts for 2028.
2. For Experience Not to Matter, a Candidate Needs Rizz
Successful left congressional candidates tend to have experience as elected officials in lower offices, genuine charisma, or both. In this cycle, Melat Kiros and Darializa Avila Chevalier fall into the charisma camp, and Donavan McKinney and Claire Valdez are sitting state legislators. Chris Rabb had a bit of both. Charisma is subjective, but it would not be outlandish to proffer that Oliver Larkin was not quite as dynamic of a public speaker as Kiros or Avila Chevalier, while also lacking the prior elected office experience of McKinney, Valdez, and Rabb. This is not a one-cycle phenomenon: compare Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib in 2018. Both won, one on the strength of generational communication skills and one with a steadier but less remarkable style underlaid with a record of service as a state legislator.
What does that mean for Metro DC DSA in 2028? Well, the reality is that we do not have a large bench of democratic socialist state or county legislators. There are none in Virginia, and, even if one or more gets elected in 2027, those new legislators will not be sufficiently entrenched for their experience to be compelling to voters. In Maryland, the cupboard is slightly less bare (especially when considering unendorsed democratic socialists like Kristin Mink and Vaughn Stewart), but it is not overflowing either. For the future, we absolutely can and should create a pipeline to draft democratic socialist state and county legislators for congressional runs. To some extent, we are already doing that. 2028, however, will come too soon. Accordingly, our recruitment will need to over-index for charisma.
3. The District Matters
It is not a coincidence that every DSA-endorsed congressional primary win this cycle was in a district anchored by a major city. Democratic socialist candidates do better in cities than they do in suburban and rural areas, and DSA canvassing tactics are much easier to pull off in urban areas. DSA candidates have also tended to do better in heavily Democratic districts than they have in purple districts, where primary voters may be more concerned that nominating a democratic socialist in Democratic primaries would increase the likelihood of a Republican general election win. Their districts have varied from relatively poor districts such as MI-13 and NY-13 to economically diverse districts such as CO-1 and NY-7, but they have generally not been affluent ones.
These are not ironclad rules, but Oliver Larkin’s defeat offers a case in point. The Florida district in which he was running has only a slight Democratic lean and is largely suburban. In regional context, it was comparatively high-income. Within its large and ideologically diverse Jewish population, there is a subset of moderate Zionist voters who may not be receptive to appeals to solidarity with the Palestinian people. This portion of the electorate is no more of an impediment to left-wing electoral gains than are right-wing evangelical Christian Zionists in other parts of the country, but it is a relevant factor for the targeting of resources nonetheless. Beyond DSA-endorsed campaigns, some progressive candidates — such as Analilia Mejia (NJ-11) and Adam Hamawy (NJ-12) — have had success in suburban districts, although it is worth noting that both New Jersey districts have portions with genuine urban density and are reasonably well-served by public transportation.
In our region, we have a distinct disadvantage: our core city, DC, has no congressional representation. We recently proved that we can win across an electorate of equivalent size to that of a congressional district with Janeese Lewis George’s historic victory in the DC mayoral primary. But we cannot leverage that win — as New York City DSA did Zohran Mamdani’s — into seats in the U.S. House of Representatives. We have to look to the suburbs.
From there, the question is this: which districts are more like New Jersey’s racially and socioeconomically diverse, solidly Democratic, and transit-connected 12th District, where Adam Hamawy won, and less like Florida’s comparatively white and moderate 25th District where Oliver Larkin lost? (NJ-12 is nominally higher-income than FL-25 but notably not in comparison to the broader metropolitan areas in which they are located.)
All congressional districts in Greater Washington are at least Democratic leaning, but VA-8, VA-11, MD-4, MD-5, and MD-8 are heavily Democratic enough that electability concerns are unlikely to be persuasive. By contrast, VA-7, VA-10, and MD-6 risk tipping into competitive territory, at least when the national political environment favors Republicans. Of the solidly Democratic districts, VA-8, MD-4, and MD-8 are better served by transit than VA-11 and MD-5. All of these districts are racially and ethnically diverse, with it also being noteworthy that MD-4 is a majority-Black district. It is no secret that DSA has sometimes struggled with Black voters, but that should not be decisive in thinking about congressional districts to target. After all, Chris Rabb and Donavan McKinney both won primaries in plurality-Black districts, and Janeese Lewis George, of course, won the mayoral primary in plurality-Black DC.
Where the districts diverge most significantly is with respect to income. All but MD-4 are quite high-income, with VA-11 the wealthiest. MD-4, by contrast, is by far the most working-class congressional district in the region. MD-8, though much more progressive than FL-25, has a significant contingent of voters who, to varying degrees, may not be sympathetic to appeals to solidarity with Palestine. Based on these factors, MD-4 appears to have the most in common with districts elsewhere in which DSA-endorsed candidates have succeeded.
4. The Coalition Matters (But Not How It Usually Does)
It is conventional wisdom in Metro DC DSA electoral organizing circles that our candidates fare best when they have a left-labor coalition backing them. In a race for Congress, no one should turn their nose up at the potential support of such a coalition, yet the support of the likes of the Metropolitan Washington Council of the AFL-CIO, CASA in Action, Progressive Maryland, and New Virginia Majority are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for victory on their own.
Democratic socialist candidates — particularly those challenging incumbents or their hand-picked successors — have won without the support of erstwhile allies who we have tended to think are critical. Claire Valdez, Darializa Avila Chevalier, and Chris Rabb had much less union support than Antonio Reynoso and, in particular, Adriano Espaillat and Sharif Street. What has mattered more is the support of the progressive PAC Justice Democrats, which has played an outsized role in left insurgent runs for Congress since 2018. After this year’s cycle, American Priorities looks set to join Justice Democrats as one of the ingredients of electoral victory.
Of course, these PACs support is not a guarantee of victory either. See Junaid Ahmed’s relatively narrow loss to Melissa Bean in Illinois’ 8th District, a race in which there was a local DSA endorsement and some of the trappings of FL-25: a relatively high-income, majority-white, suburban district with a narrow Democratic edge. But even if the support of Justice Democrats (and American Priorities) is not a guarantee, it is common to victories by Claire Valdez, Darializa Avila Chevalier, Chris Rabb, Donavan McKinney, and Melat Kiros. If we were to seriously consider a run for Congress, we should proactively align with Justice Democrats and American Priorities, in addition to seeking the kind of left-labor endorsements that we have historically prioritized but may be more difficult to attain if we are challenging a particularly strong incumbent.
5. The Opponent Matters
Democratic socialist candidates have beaten candidates who may, at first flush, seem strong but have flaws upon closer inspection, as well as candidates who are more obviously weaker. They generally have not beaten multi-term incumbents who are good demographic fits for their districts, stay reasonably well-rooted in their districts, and deploy solid retail politics skills. Adriano Espaillat and Diana DeGette — like Lacy Clay and Joe Crowley before them — came across as out-of-touch. The opponents of Chris Rabb and Claire Valdez, however, were not incumbents. Shri Thanedar, whom Donavan McKinney defeated in the Democratic primaries, has never been associated with the effective practice of retail politics, was a less-than-logical fit for a plurality-Black district, and has a history of bizarre behavior. Jimmy Gomez, defeated by Angela Gonzales-Torres in a general election contest between two Democrats, faced highly-publicized sexual misconduct allegations (which he denied). By contrast, Wesley Bell, who beat Cori Bush, and Jared Moskowitz, who beat Oliver Larkin, are reasonably young incumbents who fit the demographics of their districts and are hard to characterize as out-of-touch, no matter how repugnant their views on Palestine.
Lastly, it can be helpful to have an issue to polarize the primary electorate around, like the genocide in Gaza, but it is not a necessity, as evidenced by Claire Valdez’s victory over the consistently progressive Antonio Reynoso.
Among Greater Washington’s incumbents across the five most heavily Democratic districts, their relative strengths, as well as their odds of running again, vary. Jamie Raskin (MD-8) is beloved in his district and fairly progressive. He would be virtually impossible to beat under any conceivable circumstances. Glenn Ivey (MD-4) does not exude Raskin’s secular saint vibes, but his family is an institution, he is personally well-liked even by people who dislike his politics, and he maintains an active presence in the district. He has also aggressively moved over the past few months to negate the force of Palestine as a wedge issue, breaking with AIPAC after receiving significant largesse from them dating back to 2022. Adrian Boafo (MD-5) is not even in office yet and won the nomination with less than one-third of the vote. As of this writing, he is still in bed with AIPAC (as well as crypto and other noxious interests). For purposes of 2028, he will be a relatively weak incumbent. Don Beyer (VA-8) is reasonably well-liked but does not excite passion. Now entering his late 70s, he may be susceptible to a generational change argument. Also in light of his age, he may consider retiring rather than running for reelection.
James Walkinshaw (VA-11) may be the hardest to gauge: less established than Raskin, Ivey, and Beyer but more established than Boafo; moderate but also in the most moderate district of the five; and generationally of a piece with Jared Moskowitz and Wesley Bell. It would seem fair to rate him as more vulnerable than Raskin, Ivey, and Beyer and less vulnerable than Boafo. Ultimately, incumbent strength counsels strongly against challenging Jamie Raskin, but otherwise can only tell us relative truths. If every other factor except for the strength of the incumbent were held equal, then MD-5 would clearly be a better target than MD-4 because Boafo is weaker than Ivey. But we know that all other factors are not equal.
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If I had to leave readers with just one takeaway, it is this: we can do this! There is ultimately no reason why Metro DC DSA cannot join the ranks of chapters that have powered a democratic socialist candidate’s way to Congress. Some of the chapters that have done so have long had formidable electoral programs, but then again, we’re not exactly chopped liver either, as we bask in the afterglow of victories for Janeese Lewis George, Aparna Raj, and Shayla Adams-Stafford. And, while the DSA chapters in New York City, Philly, and Metro Detroit have a history of chalking up big electoral victories, Denver’s does not. They built up their electoral program through Melat Kiros’ race. So, we can do this!
But, to do it right, we need a candidate (or candidates, if mounting challenges in multiple districts) who can raise a mountain of cash, who is an effective communicator and who ideally has a track record in office, who is running in a hospitable district, who gets the backing of Justice Democrats and American Priorities, all while hopefully garnering more conventional left-labor coalition support too, and who has a flawed opponent. That is a lot of details, but if the chapter starts now, Metro DC DSA has the capacity to figure all of this out. If we do, it will be an exciting growth opportunity for us all.